386, 25 L. R. A. 349; People v. Sanborn, 14 N. Y. St. Rep. 123.

774; Miller v. Rapp, 7 Ind. App. 89, 34 N. BE. 126; Hall v. Bartlett, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 297; Branyan v. Kay, 38 S. C. 283, 11 S.

663; Hale v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 60

257; Edwards -v. State, 25 Ark. 444; People v. Ah Choy, 1 Idaho, 317; State v.

880; Peyton v. State, 54 Neb. 188, 74 N. W. 597.

682.

1044; Crawford v. Vinton, 102 Mich. 83, 62 N. W. 988.

457; State v. uire, 39 Ohio St. 197;

1038, 32 L. R. A. 822

889; Clark v. Morse, 16 La. 576.

138.

621. . Also a special act passed by a legislative body in the exercise of a quast judicial power. Thus, bills of attainder, bills of pains and penalties, are spoken of.

159; Young v. Stone, 61 App. Div. 364, 70 N. Y. Supp. 558.—Bill payable. In a merchant’s accounts, all bills which he has accepted, and promtenory notes which he has made, are called “bills payable,” and are entered in a ledger account under that name, and recorded in a book bearing the same title—Bill receivable. In a merchant’s accounts, all notes, drafts, checks, etc., payable to him, or of which he is to receive the proceeds at a future date, are called “bills receivable,” and are entered in a ledger-account under that name, and also noted in a book bearing the same title. State v.

881; Park v. Druggists’ Ass'n, 175 N. Y. 1, 67 N. E. 136, 62 L. R. A. 632, 96 Am. St.

12.—Carry stock. To provide funds or credit for its payment for the period agreed upon from the date of purchase. Saltus v. Genin, 16 N. Y. Super. Ct. 260. And see Pickering v. Demerritt, 100 Mass. 421.

420; Somers v. Pierson, 16 N. J. Law, 181.

831: State v. Baldwin, 1 Tread. Const. {S. C.) 202.—Ohallenge to the panel. The

25.

612; Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 649. It is quite different from a common fishery, with which, however, it is frequently confounded—Common of shack. A species of common by vicinage prevailing in the counties of Norfolk, Lincoln, and Yorkshire, in England; being the right of persons occupyin lands lying together in the same common fiel to turn out their cattle after harvest to feed promiscuous!” in that field. 2 Steph. Comm. 6, ; 5 Coke, 65.—Common of turbary. Common of turbary, in its modern sense, is the right of taking peat or turf from the waste land of another. for fuel in the commoner’s house. Williams, Common, 187; Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, '10 Wend. (N. ¥.) 647.—Common sans mombre. Common without number, that is, without limit as-to the number of cattle which may be turned on; otherwise called “common without stint.” Bract. fols. 536, 222b; 2

137. A naked confession is an admission of the guilt of the party. but which is not supported by any evidence of the commission of the crime. A relative confession, in the older crim-

408: State v. Alexander, 109 La. 557, 33

72; Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 83 Fed. 316, 27 C. C. A. 250; Palmer v. De. Witt, 47

876.

68.—Oounty co te. A city or town, with more or less territory annexed, having the privilege to be a county of itself, and not to be comprised in any other county; such as London, York, Bristol, Norwich and other cities in

970; Reid v. Terwilliger. 116 N. Y. 530. 22 N. B. 1091; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. 8S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622. 37 L. Ed. 468; Wade v. Power Co.. S. C. 206, 29 8. B. 233. 64 Am. St. Rep. 676; Gatzow v. Buening, 106

404; Wolcott v. Ely, 2 Allen (Mass.) 340;

957; Railroad Co. v. Clark, 92 Fed. 968, 85 CO. C. A. 120. —Disputable presumption. <A presumption of law, which may be rebutted or disproved. See PRESUMPTIONS.—Matter dispute. The subject of litigation; the matter for which a suit is brought and upon which issue is joined, and in relation to which jurors are called and witnesses examined. Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall. 3839, 17 IL. Ed. 557; Smith v. Adams, 130 U.

122; Trustees of University v. North Carolina R. Co., 76 N. C. 1038, 22 Am. Rep. 671; De Koven vy. Alsop, 205 Ill. 309, 68 N.

565. 44 Am. St. Rep. 310.—Ex dividend. A..phrase used by stock brokers, meaning that a ‘sale of corporate stock doés not carry with it the selle#’s right to receive his proportionate share of a dividend already declared and shortly payable.

406; Ames v. Ames, 128 Mass. 277;

634, 48 L. R. A. 616, 81 Am. St. Rep. 504; Wynn v. Garland, 19 Ark. 23, 68 Am.

714, 21 Am. St. Rep. 901; Sill v. Sill, 31

502; Darby v. Carson, 9 Ohio, 149. Also the name of a writ issued to a sheriff, constable, or marshal, authorizing and requiring him to execute the judgment of the court.

588, 9 L. R. A. 366,

826, 24 Am. St. Rep. 507: Hackney v.

495; Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N. Y. 179, 15 N. E. 67, 2 Am. St. Rep. 4085.

546.

1111; White v. Miners’ Nat. Bank, 102

989, 39 Am. St. Rep. 386.—Foreclosure sale. A sale of mortgaged property to obtain satisfaction of the mortgage out of the proceeds, whether authorized by a decree of the court or by a power of sale contained in the mortgage. See Johnson v. Cook, 96 Mo. App. 442, 70 S. W. 526.—Statutory foreclosure. The term is sometimes applied to foreclosure by execution of a power of sale contained in the mortgage, without recourse to the courts, as it must conform to the provisions of the statute regulating such sales. See Mowry v. Sanborn, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 548.—Strict foreclosure. A decree of strict foreclosure of a mortgage finds the amount due under the mortgage, orders its payment within a certain limited time, and provides that, in default of such payment, the debtor's right and equity of redemption shall be forever barred and foreclosed; its effect is to vest the title of the property absolutely in the mortgagee, on default in payment, without uny sale of the property: gr tage v. Hinkle, 45 N. J. Eq. 162, 16 Atl. 701; Lightcap vy.

142; Miskey’s Appeal, 107 Pa. 626;

257; McNett v. Cooper (C. C.) 13 Fed. 590; People v. Krist, 168 N. Y. 19, 60 N.

172; Thomas vy. Mueller, 106 Ill. 43.

187; State v. Reynolds, 42 Kan. 820, 22

807; Rheem v. Holliday, 16 Pa. 352;

720, 72 Am. St. Rep. 642; Lafferty v.

550.—Pyromania. Incendiarism; a form of affective insanity in which the mania takes the form of an irresistible impulse to burn or set fire to things —Oike{ mania, a form of in- Banity manifesting itself in a morbid state of the domestic affections, as an unreasonable dislike of wife or child without cause or provocation.

300.

976, 55 L. R. A. 882; O’Leary v. Cook

362; oward v. Sexton, 4 N. Y. 161; Herbener v. Crossan, 4 Pennewill (Del.) 38, 55 Atl. 224.—General malice. General malice is wickedness, a disposition to do wrong, a “black and diabolica) heart, regardless of social duty: and fatally bent on mischief.” Neal v. Nelson, 117 N. C. 398, 23 8. E. 428, 53 Am. St. Rep. 590; Brooks v. Jones, 33 N. C. 260.—Implied malice. Malice inferred by legal reasoning and necessary deduction from the res geste or the conduct of the party. Malice inferred from any deliberate cruel act committed by one person against another, however sudden. Whart. om. . What is called “general malice” is often thus inferred.

527; Warren v. Mower, 11 Vt. 385.—Stat-

648.

28 Johnson vy. Railway Co., Wiss 529, 56 N W. 886. —Negligence per se. Conduct, whether of action or omission, which may be declared and treated as negligence without any argument or proof as to the particular surrounding circumstances, either because it is in violation of a statute or valid municipal ordinance, or because it is so palpably opposed to the dictates of common prudence that it can be said without hesitation or doubt that no careful person would have been guilty of it.

489; Rice v. Sims, 3 Hill (S. C.) 5;

269; McCartney v. Kipp, 171 Pa. 644, 33

233; McDonnell v. Alabama Gold L,

1055.—Officer de facto. As distinguished from an officer de jure. this is the designation of one who is in the actual possession and administration of the office. under some colorable or apparent authority, although his title to the same. whether by election or appointment, is in reality invalid or at least formally questioned. See Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. §. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 78; State v. Carroll. 38 Conn. 449. 9 Am. Rep. 4090; Trenton v. McDaniel. 52 N. C. 107: Barlow v. Stanford, 82 IH. 298: Brown v. Lunt. 37 Me. 423;

817: Brenn v. Troy, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 421; Clark Civil Tp. v. Brookshire, 114 Ind. 487, 16 N. E. 1382.—Ordinary seaman. sailor who is capable of performing the ordinary or routine duties of a seaman, but who is not yet so proficient in the knowledge and practice of all the various duties of a sailor at sea as to be rated as an “able” seaman.—Ordinary skill in an art, means that degree of skill which men engaged in that particular art usually employ; not that which belongs to a few men only, of extraordinary endowments and capacities. Baltimore Baseball Club Co. v. Pickett, 78 Md. 375, 28 Atl. 279, 22 L. R. A. 690. = aah St. Rep. 304; Waugh v. Shunk, 20

486; Castle v. Madison, 113 Wis. 3 89 N. W. 156; Iowa County Sup’rs v. Minera

1012; Hood v. State, 44 Ala. 81.

522, 28 L. R. A of Education. 127 Mich. 530, 86 N. W. 1036, 54 L. R. A. 736.—Police regulations. Laws of a state, or ordinances of a municipality, which have for their object the preservation and -protection of pubjic peace and good order, and _of the health, morals, and security of the peope State v. Greer. 78 Mo. 194; Ex parte

707.

1048.

368; Tennessee v. Whitworth (C. C.) 22

558; O’Hara v. Miller, 1 Kulp (Pa.) 295.

116, 57 Am. Rep. 308; Snider v. Rinehart, 18 Colo. 18, 31 Pac. 716.

553; Houston v. Brush, 66 Vt. 331, 290

380; Scott v. London, etc., Docks Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 596.—Res judicata. A matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. A phrase of the civil law, constantly quoted in the books. 2 Kent, Comm. 120.—Res litigioss. In Roman law, things which are in litigation; property or rights which constitute the subject-matter of a pending action—Res mancipi. In Roman law. Certain classes of things which could not be aliened or transferred except by means of a certain formal ceremony of conveyance called “mancipatio,” (cg. v.) These included land, houses, slaves, horses, and cattle. All other things were called “res nec mancipi.” The distinction was abolished by Justinian,

347; Miller v. Lapham, 44 Vt. 435;

499; Graham Vv. St. Joseph Tp., 67 Mich. 652, 35 N. W. 808; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9

649; Merrill v. St. Louis, 83 Mo. ‘258, 53

126—Trust fund. A fund held by a trustee for the specific purposes of the trust; in a more general sense, a fund which, legally or equitably,-is subject to.be devoted to a particdla® purpése and cannot or should not be diverted therefrom. In this sense it is often said that the capital and other property of a

147.—Verdict subject to opinion eof court. A verdict returned by the jury, the entry of judgment upon which is subject to the determination of points of law reseryed by the court upon the trial.

639.—Vested remainder. See REMAIN- DER.—Vested rights. In constitutional law. Rights which have so completely and definitely accrued to or settled in a person that they are not subject to be defeated or canceled by the act of any other N ahobay person, and which it is right and equitable that the government should recognize and protect, as being lawful in themselves, and settled according to the then cur rent rules of law, and of which the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice, or of which he could not justly be deprived otherwise than by the established methods of procedure and for the public welfare. See Cassard v. Tracy, 52 La. Ann. 835, 27 South. 368, 49 L. R. A. 272; Stimson Land Co. v. Rawson

717, 33 Am. St. Rep. 941; Porter v. Armstrong, 129 N. C. 101, 39 & E. 799.