582.

707; Cady v. Brooklyn Union Pub. Co., 23 Misc. Rep. 409, 51 N. Y. Supp.:198.

496. An advancement is any provision by a parent made to and accepted by a child out of his estate, either in money or property, during his life-time, over and above the obligation of the parent for maintenance and education. Code Ga. 1882. § 2579. An ‘“advancement by portion,” within the meaning of the statute, is a sum given by a parent to establish a child in life, (as by starting him in business,) or to make a provision for the child, (as on ‘on marriage of a daughter.) L. R. 20 Eq.

81.—Ancient readings. Readings or

654; Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 10 Pick, (Mass.) 293; McLellan v. Dalton, 10

767; Mauritz v. Ralflroad Co. (©. C.) 23 Fed. 771; Dexter v. Railroad Co., 42 N.

123. —Bargainee. The pers to a bargain to whom the subject-matter of the bargain or thing barpam for is to go; the grantee in a deed of argain and sale—Bargainor. The party to a bargain who is to perform the contract by delivery of the subject-matter.—Catching barain. A bargain by which money is loaned, at an extortionate or extravagant rate, to an heir or any one who has an estate in reversion or expectancy, to be repaid on the vesting of his interest; or a similar unconscionable bargain with such person for the purchase outright of his expectancy.

90.—Bill of appeal. An ancient, but now abolished, method of criminal prosecution. See BATTEL.

272.

335.

189.

540.

218.

855.

532. ae

759; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 467; Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 88; Grant v.

745; The Iroquois, 118 Fed. 1003, 55

160. ; eo

190; Wessels v. Colebank, 174 Ill. 618, 51 N. EB. 639; Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, - 136 Cal. 36, 68 Pac. 308; Stevenson v. Wallace, 27 Grat. (Va.) 87.

115; Van Wormer v. Crane. 51 Mich. 363, 16 N. W. 686, 47 Am. Rep. 582; Hatch

182; King v. Delaware Ins. Co., 14

143; State v. Brown, 95 N. C. 686;

454: Russell v. Fagan, 7 Houst. (Del.) 389, 8 Atl. 258: Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nevill, 60 Ark. 8375, 30 8. W. 425, 28 L. BR. A. 80, 46 Am. St. Rep. 208.

285; In re Railroad Com’rs, 15 Neb. 629, 50 N. W. 276; In re Davies, 168 N. Y. 89,- 61 N. BE. 118, 56 L. R. A. 855; State v, Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N. E. 252, 4 L. R. A. 79. —Executive administration, or ministry. A political term in England, applicable to t higher and responsible class of public officials by whom tbe chief iepartments of the government of the kingdom are administered. The number of these amounts to fifty or sixty per sons. Their tenure of office depends on the confidence of a majority of the house of commons, and they are supposed to be agreed on all mat: ters of general policy except such as are specifically left open questions. Cab. Lawy.—Executive officer. An officer of the executive department of government; one in whom resides the power to execute the laws; one whose duties are to cause the laws to be executed and obeyed. Thorne v. San Francisco, 4 Cal. 146;

330.

721: Murphy v. Insurance Co., 205 Pa. 444, 55 Atl. 19; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v.

319. The further ideas connoted by this term are that it is a deprivation, ‘(that is, against the will of the losing party,) and that the property is either transferred to another or resumed by the original grantor.

284.

574; Johnson v. Reynolds, 3 Kan. 261;

580; Abington v. North Bridgewater, 23

605. Wrongful. 53 Law J. P. D. 65.

811; Francke v. His Wife, 29.La. Ann. 304; Hall v. Unger, 11 Fed. Cas. 261; Bickhell v. Spear, 38 Misc. Rep. 389, 77 N. Y.

486; Loventhal v. Morris, 108 Ala. 332, 15

507; Insurance Co. v. Winsmore, 124

28; People v. Tax Com’rs, 99 N. ¥. 154, 1 N. B. 401.—Just title. By the term “just title,” in cases of prescription, we do not understand that which the possessor may have derived from the true owner, for then no true prescription would be necessary, but a title which the possessor may have received from any person whom he honestly believed to be the real owner, provided the title were such as to transfer the ownership of the property. Civ.

546.—Latent defect. A defect in an article sold, which is known to the seller, but not to the purchaser, and is not discoverable by mere observation. Hoe v. Sanborn, 21

212; Clark v. Binney, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 115; Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 198; Root v. King, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 620.

707; Woolworth v. Star .. OT App.

725; Smith v. Smith, 23 Wis. 181, 99

725; Smith v. Smith, 23 Wis. 176, 99 Am

153. <A conditional limitation is where an estate is so expressly defined and limited by the words of its creation that it cannot endure for any longer time than till the contingency ha upon which the estate is to fail. 1 Step mm. 309. Between conditional limitations and estates depending on conditions subsequent there is this difference: that in the former the estate determines as soon as the contingency happens; but in the latter it endures until the grantor or his heirs take advantage of the breach. Id. 310.—Collateral limitation. One which gives an interest in an estate for a specified period, but makes the right of enjoyment to depend on some collateral event, ar an estate to A. till B. shall =£° to Rome. Templeman v. Gibbs, 86 Tex. 358, 24 S. W. 792; Kent,

661; Thomas v. State, 30 Ark. 435. Malicious mischief or damage is a species of injury to private property, which the law considers as a public crime. This is such as is ‘done, not animo furandi, or with an intent of gaining by another's loss, but either out of a spirit of wanton cruelty or wicked revenge. In this latter light it bears a near relation to the

582.— terial power. See Power. —Ministerial trust. Xe TRUST.

537; Breed v. Judd, 1 Gray (Mass.) 458.

534; Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Barringer, 73

534 ; Griffin v. Willow, 43 Wis. 512.—Wanton negligence. Reck: less indifference to the consequences of an act or omission, where the party acting or failing to act is conscious of his conduct and, without any actual intent to injure, is aware, from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his conduct will inevitably or probably result in injury to another. Louisebb, 97 Ala. 308, 12

653; Trustees of Third Presbyterian Congregation v. Andruss, 21 N. J. Law, 328;

625; i v. Steele, 231

458 3 Garland v. Smith, 164 Mo. 1, 64 e W. 18. es

692.

191; Bennett v. Garlock, 10 Hun (N. Y.) 337; Dana y. Murray, 122 N. Y. 604, 26 N. E. 21; Booth v. Terrell, 16 Ga. 24; Palmer v.

631—Res fungibiles. In the civil law. Fungible things; things of such a nature that they can be replaced by equal quantities and qualities when returning a loan or del‘vering goods purchased, for example, so many bushels of wheat or so many dollars; but a particular horse or a particular jewel would not be of this character.—Res furtive. In Scotch law. Goods which have been stolen. Bell.—Res gestse. Things done; transactions; essential circumstances surrounding the subject. The circumstances, facts, and declarations which grow. out of the main fact, are contemporaneous with it, and serve to illustrate its character. See

2138. ;

744: MecNitt v. Turner, 16 Wall. 361, 21

123.

66.

356.—Term probatory. The period of time allowed to the promoter of an ecclesiastical suit to produce his witnesses, and prove the facts on which he rests his case. Coote, Ecc.

97; Edwards v. Davenport (C. C.) 20