1054.

777: St. Touts. etc., R. Co. v. Barnett, 65 Ark. 255, 45 S. W. 550; Aurora Branch R.

345.—Anoillary bill or suit. One growing out of and auxiliary to another action or suit, either at law or in equity. such as a bill for discovery, or a proceeding for the enforcement of a judgment, or to set aside fraudulent transfers of property. Coltrane v. Templeton, 106 Fed. 370, 45 C. C. A. 328: In re Williams,

453; Offield v. Ish, 21 Wash. 277, 57

809; Reservoir Co. v. People. 8 Colo. 614, 9 Pac. 794; McCall v. Porter, 42 Or. 49, 70 Pac. 820; McDonald v. Mining Co., 13

605.

600, 62 Am. St. Rep. 681.

984, 4 L R. A. 826, 12 Am. St. Rep. 162; Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 185, 7 Pac. 4356.

548: ‘Railroad Co. v. Terry. 8 Ohio St 570: Railroad Co. v. McCoy. 81 Ky. 408;

947, 57 L. R. A. 616, 98 Am. St. Rep. 604.

862; State v. Credle, 91 N. C. 640; State v. Groves, 119 N. C. 822, 25 S. E. 819; First

62.—Certificate of regis In mari-

198.

707.

586.

891.

812; Smith v. Railway Co., 30 Minn. 169, 14 N. W. 797; Loftus-v. Bennett, 68 App. Div. 128, 74 N. Y. Supp. 290. Special damages are those which are the actual, but not the neceseat result of the injury complained of. and which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in the particular case, that is,

418; Stanton v. Railroad Co.. 50 Conn. 272, 22 Atl. 300, 21 Am. St. Rep. 110; Springer v. Fuel Co., 196 Pa. 156, 46 Atl. 870; Telegraph Co. v. Lawson, 66 Kan. 660, 72 Pac. 283;

681.—Imaginary damages. is term is sometimes u as equivalent to “exemplary,” “vindictive,” or “punitive” damages. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 Pac. 119, 49 Am. Rep. $66.—Intervening mages. Such damages to an appellee as result from the delay caused by the appea]l. McGregor v. Balch, 17 Vt. 568; easely v. Buckminster, -1 Tyler (Vt.) 267;

51; Campbell v. Hudson, 106 Mich. 528, 64 N. W. 483.

920, 68 L. R. A. 275; Blaufus v. People, 69 N. Y. 111, 25 Am. Rep. 148; U.S. v. Doherty (D. C.) 27 Fed. 730; Leonard v. Grant (C.

266, 5 L. R. A. 498, 18 Am. St. Rep. 175;

64. See DEVOLUTION. :

1057; State v. Woodruff, 68 N. J. Law, 89, 52 Atl. 204.—Regular election. A general, usual, or stated election. When applied to elections, the terms “regular” and “general” are used interchangeably and synonymously. The word “regular” is used in reference to a general election occurring throughout the state. State v. Conrades, 45 Mo. 47; Ward v. Clark, 35

135, 1 L. R. A. 111; Wolff v. U. S., 7

1080, 10 L. R. A. 847; Ex parte Ryan, 44 Cal. 558; Kx parte Duncan, 53 Cal. 410;

686, 59 Am. Rep. 404—Exzpress consideration. A consideration which is distinctly and specifically named in the written con-

1092; Willard v. Warren. 17 Wend. (N.

633.

448.—Geo to protest. Commercial paper is said to “go to protest’? when it is dishonor ed by non-payment or non-acceptance and is handed to a notary for protest.-Go without day. Words used to denote that a party is dismissed the court. He is said to go without day, because there Is no day appointed for him to appear again. °

67; Irving v. Camnbell, 121 N. Y. 358, 2 N. B 821, 8 L. R. A. 620; Giitespte v.

296; Buck v. Burk, 18 N. Y. 340; Bank v. Drake (Iowa) 79 N.

319; McKeough v. McKeough, 69 Vt. 34, 37° Atl. 275; Lloitt v. Webb, 36 N. H. 158;

410, 16 Am. St. Rep. 4838; Hopkinson v.

555; Reid v. Alaska Packing Co., 43 Or. 429, 73 Pac. 837.

645.

166; State v. Herges, 55 Minn. 464, 57

931.

836; Shaeffer v. Weed, 8 IU. 514;

991.

241; In re White, 121 N. Y. 406, 24 N.

671.

191; Una v. Dodd, 88 N. J. Eq. 186.

713.

109, 75 Am. St. Rep. 529. And see IN-

744; In re Beck, 63 Kan. 57, 64 Pac. 971: Bell v. Otts, 101 Ala. 186, 138 South. 48. 46 Am. St. Rep. 117.

1074; Perry v. Tynen, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 140.—Judicial admissions. Admissions made voluntarily by a party which appear of record in the proceedings of the court.—Judicial authority. The power and authority appertaining to the office of a judge; jurisdiction; the official right to hear and determine questions in controversy.—Judicial business. Such as involves the exercise of judicial power, or the application of the mind and authority of a court to some contested matter, or the conduct of judicial proceedings, as distinguished from such ministerial and other acts, incident to the progress of a cause, a8 may be performed by the parties, counsel, or officers of the court without application to the court or judge. See Heisen Vv.

759. ,

676.

961; Milton v. State, 6 Neb. 143; State v. Rutten, 18 Wash. 211, 43 Pac. 30.—Special malice. Particular or personal malice; that is, hatred, ill will, or a vindictive disposition against a particular individual.—Universal malice. By this term is not meant a malicious urpose to take the life of al! persons, but it s that depravity of the human heart which determines to take life upon slight or insufficient provocation, without knowing or vou l wee may be the victim. Mitchell v. State,

544. ,

572.

604,1 L. R. A. 854, 7 Am. St. Rep. 268, —Miner’s inch. See INCH.

484; First Nat. Bank v. Blevator Co., 11 N. D. 280, 91 N. W. 487.

658; McMullin v. Wooley, 2 Lans. (N.

864.

780; Gregory v. Pershbaker, 73 Cal. 109, 14 Pac. 401; Freezer v. Sweeney, 8 Mont. 508, 21 Pac. 20.

258.—Plea side. The plea side of a court is that branch or department of the court which entertains or takes cognisance of civil actions and suits, as distinguished from its criminal or crown department. Thns the court of king’s bench is said to have a plea side and &.crown or criminal side; the one branch or department of it being devoted to the cognizance of civil actions, the other to criminal proceedings and matters peculiarly concerning the crown. So the court of exchequer is said to have a plea side and a crown side; the one being appropriated to civil actions, the other to matters of revenue. Brown.—Pleas of the crown. In English Jaw. A phrase now employed to signify criminal causes, in which the king is a party. Formerly it signified royal causes for offenses of a greater magnitude than mere misdemeanors.—Pleas roll. In English practice. A record upon which are entered all the pleadings in a cause, in their regular order, and the issne—Pure plea. In equity pleading. One which relies wholly on some matter outside those referred to in the bill: as a plea of a release on a settled account.Sham plea. A false plea; a plea of false or fictitious matter, subtly drawn so as to entrap an opponent, or create delay. 38

897.

426.

303; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 2 Sup. Ct. 443, 27 L. Ed. 506; Opp v. Ten

1; Hinkle vy. State, 94 Ga. 595, 21 S.

696.

39.

764, 6 L. R. A. 444; State v. Owens, 63 Tex. 270; State v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190;

3; Mernaugh v. Orlando, 41 Fla. 433, 27 South. 34; Hunter v. Memphis, 938 Tenn. 571, 26 S. W. 828.

703; Solon v. Willlamsburgh Sav. Bank, 85 Hun (N. Y.) 7.

800; Russell v. Rolfe, 50 Ala. 57; Lowry v. McMillan, 8 Pa. 163, 49 Am. Dec. 501;

868, 8 Am. St. Rep. 251; Wingate v.

442, 84 Am. St. er 70; Pillot v. Landon, 46 N. J. Eq. 310, 19 Atl. 25.— Express trust. <A trust created or declared in express terms, and usually in writing, as distinguished from one inferred by the law. from the conduct or dealings of the parties. State v. Campbell, 59 Kan. 246, 52 Pac. 454; Kaphan v. Toney (Tenn. Ch.) 58 S. W. 913: McMonagle v. McGlinn (C. ©.) 85 Fed. 91; Ransdel v,

578; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 172 Mass. 10

226, 88 L. R. A.

89; State v. Continental Tobacco Co., 177 Mo. 1, 75 S. W. 737; Quéen Ins. Co. v.

66; State v. Guiton, 51 La. Ann. 155, 24 South. 784.

740.

408.—Collateral warranty, in old conveyancing, was where the heir's title to the land neither was nor could have been derived from the warranting ancestor. Thus where a younger brother released to his father’s disseisor, with warranty, this was collateral to the elder brother. The whole doctrine of collateral warranty seems repugnant to plain and unsophisticated reason and justice; and even its technical grounds are so obscure that the ablest legal writers are not agreed upon the subject. Wharton. Micheau v. Crawford, 8 N.

1113.—Private waters. Non-navigable streams, or bodies of water not open to the resort and use of the general public, but entirely owned and controlled by one or more individuals.—Public waters. Such as are adapted for the purposes of navigation, or those to which the general public have a right of access, as distinguished from artificial lakes, ponds, and other bodies of water privately owned, or similar natural bodies of water owned exclusively by one or more persons. See Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N. W. 1139, 18 L. R. A. 670, 38 Am. St. Rep. 541; Carter v. Thurston, 58 N. H. 104, 42 Am. Rep. 584; Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N. J. Law, 369; West Point Water-Power Co. v. State, 49 Neb. 223, 68 N. W. 507; State v. Theriault, 70 Vt. 617, 41 Atl. 1080, 43 L. R. A. 290, 67 Am. St. Rep. 648.— Subterranean waters. Waters which lie wholly’ beneath the surface of the ground, and which either ooze and seep through the subsurface strata without pursuing any defined course or channel, (percolating waters.) or flow in a permanent and regular but invisible course, or lie under the earth in a more or less immovable body, as a subterranean lake.—Surface waters. As distinguished from the waters of a natural stream, lake, or pond, surface waters are such as diffuse themselves over the surface of the ground, following no defined course or channel, and not gathering into or forming any more definite body of water than a mere bog or marsh. They generally originate in rains and melting snows, but the flood waters of a river may also be considered as surface waters if they become separated from the main current, or leave it never to return, and spread out over lower ground. See Schaefer v. Marthaler, 34