Va
Categories: Property
Definition (1910 Edition)
495, 39 S. B. 126, 55 L. R. A. 155, 86 Am.
489. ero corporation. One engaged in commerce in the broadest sense of that term; hence including a railroad comany. Sweatt v. Railroad Co., 23 Fed. Cas.
396, 16 S. E. 274; Bank v. Hopkins, 47
370, 9 S. B. 248; McIntyre v. Railroad
26, 1 S. BE. 395; Parish v. Sloan, 38 N. ©. 609; Goodman vy. Ford, 23 Miss. 595; Hostetter Co. v. Lyons Co. (C. C.) 99 Fed. 735.
606, 5 S. E. 704; State v. Conner, 86 Tex. 133, 28 S. W. 1103; Payne v. Fresco, 4 Kulp (Pa.) 26; Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. 466. —Directory trust. Where, by the terms of a trust, the fund is directed to be vested in a particular manner till the period arrives at which it is to be appropriat d, this is called a ‘‘directory trust.” It is distinguished from a discretionary trust, in which the trustee has a dis-
816; People v. Priori, 164 N. Y. 459, 58 N. E. 668.—Opinion evidence. Evidence of what the witness thinks, believes, or infers in regard to facts in dispute, as distinguished from his personal knowledge of the facts themselves ; not admissible except (under certain limitations) in the case of experts. See Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 South. 210.—Oral evidence. Evidence he by word of mouth; the oral testimony of a witness—Original evidence, An original document, writing, or other material object introduced in evidence (Ballinger’s
14, 10 8. EB. 60,5 L. R. A. 392, 25 Am.
711, 14 S. E. 165; Louthan v. Hewes, 138
62. The laws of some of the states distinguish between “paupers” and “indigent persons,” the latter being persons who have no property or source of income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor, though self-supporting when able to work anhd-in employment. See In re Hybart, 119 N.
563, 15 S. E. 146. But while these distinctions are still observed in sume jurisdictions, they are more generally disregarded ; so that, at present, in inquisitions of lunacy and other such proceedings, the term “lunacy” has almost everywhere come to be synonymous with “insanity,” and is used as a general description of all forms of derangement or mental unsoundness, this rule being established by statute in many states and by judicial decisions in others. In re Clark, 175 N. Y. 139, 67 N. E. 212; Smith v. Hickenbottom, 57 Lowa, 733, 11 N. W. 664; Cason v.
563. 15 S. E. 146: Pyott v. Pyrott, 191
778, 17 S. E. 300; Grimes v. Wilson, 4
375, 48 Am. Rep. 398; McMillan v. Harris, 110 Ga. 72, 35 S. BE. 384, 48 L. R. A. 346, 78 Am. 8t. Rep. 93.
429.
84,148. BE 436, 15 L. R. A. 226, 32 Am.
26, 1S. E. 395; Caulfield v. Finnegan, 114 Ala. 39, 21 South. 484; Lyman vy. Little
489. ero corporation. One engaged in commerce in the broadest sense of that term; hence including a railroad comany. Sweatt v. Railroad Co., 23 Fed. Cas.
396, 16 S. E. 274; Bank v. Hopkins, 47
370, 9 S. B. 248; McIntyre v. Railroad
26, 1 S. BE. 395; Parish v. Sloan, 38 N. ©. 609; Goodman vy. Ford, 23 Miss. 595; Hostetter Co. v. Lyons Co. (C. C.) 99 Fed. 735.
606, 5 S. E. 704; State v. Conner, 86 Tex. 133, 28 S. W. 1103; Payne v. Fresco, 4 Kulp (Pa.) 26; Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. 466. —Directory trust. Where, by the terms of a trust, the fund is directed to be vested in a particular manner till the period arrives at which it is to be appropriat d, this is called a ‘‘directory trust.” It is distinguished from a discretionary trust, in which the trustee has a dis-
816; People v. Priori, 164 N. Y. 459, 58 N. E. 668.—Opinion evidence. Evidence of what the witness thinks, believes, or infers in regard to facts in dispute, as distinguished from his personal knowledge of the facts themselves ; not admissible except (under certain limitations) in the case of experts. See Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 South. 210.—Oral evidence. Evidence he by word of mouth; the oral testimony of a witness—Original evidence, An original document, writing, or other material object introduced in evidence (Ballinger’s
14, 10 8. EB. 60,5 L. R. A. 392, 25 Am.
711, 14 S. E. 165; Louthan v. Hewes, 138
62. The laws of some of the states distinguish between “paupers” and “indigent persons,” the latter being persons who have no property or source of income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor, though self-supporting when able to work anhd-in employment. See In re Hybart, 119 N.
563, 15 S. E. 146. But while these distinctions are still observed in sume jurisdictions, they are more generally disregarded ; so that, at present, in inquisitions of lunacy and other such proceedings, the term “lunacy” has almost everywhere come to be synonymous with “insanity,” and is used as a general description of all forms of derangement or mental unsoundness, this rule being established by statute in many states and by judicial decisions in others. In re Clark, 175 N. Y. 139, 67 N. E. 212; Smith v. Hickenbottom, 57 Lowa, 733, 11 N. W. 664; Cason v.
563. 15 S. E. 146: Pyott v. Pyrott, 191
778, 17 S. E. 300; Grimes v. Wilson, 4
375, 48 Am. Rep. 398; McMillan v. Harris, 110 Ga. 72, 35 S. BE. 384, 48 L. R. A. 346, 78 Am. 8t. Rep. 93.
429.
84,148. BE 436, 15 L. R. A. 226, 32 Am.
26, 1S. E. 395; Caulfield v. Finnegan, 114 Ala. 39, 21 South. 484; Lyman vy. Little
Source: Black's Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition (1910) — Public Domain.
UK commentary and modern updates are original additions. This entry is for educational
reference only and does not constitute legal advice.